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Abstract. Self modifying code is code that can modify its own instruc-
tions during the execution of the program. It is extensively used by mal-
ware writers to obfuscate their malicious code. Thus, analysing self mod-
ifying code is nowadays a big challenge. In this paper, we consider the
LTL model-checking problem of self modifying code. We model such pro-
grams using self-modifying pushdown systems (SM-PDS), an extension
of pushdown systems that can modify its own set of transitions during
execution. We reduce the LTL model-checking problem to the empti-
ness problem of self-modifying Bu¨chi pushdown systems (SM-BPDS).
We implemented our techniques in a tool that we successfully applied
for the detection of several self-modifying malware. Our tool was also
able to detect several malwares that well-known antiviruses such as Bit-
Defender, Kinsoft, Avira, eScan, Kaspersky, Qihoo-360, Baidu, Avast,
and Symantec failed to detect.
1 Introduction
Binary code presents several complex aspects that cannot be encountred in
source code. One of these aspects is self-modifying code, i.e., code that can
modify its own instructions during the execution of the program. Self-modifying
code makes reverse code engineering harder. Thus, it is extensively used to pro-
tect software intellectual property. It is also heavily used by malware writers in
order to make their malwares hard to analyse and detect by static analysers and
anti-viruses. Thus, it is crucial to be able to analyse self-modifying code.
There are several kinds of self-modifying code. In this work, we consider
self-modifying code caused by self-modifying instructions. These kind of in-
structions treat code as data. This allows them to read and write into code,
leading to self-modifying instructions. These self-modifying instructions are
usually mov instructions, since mov allows to access memory and read and
write into it.
Let us consider the example shown in Fig.1. For simplicity, the addresses’
length is assumed to be 1 byte. In the right box, we give, respectively, the binary
code, the addresses of the different instructions, and the corresponding assembly
code, obtained by translating syntactically the binary code at each address. For
example, 0c is the binary code of the jump jmp. Thus, 0c 02 is translated to
jmp 0x2 (jump to address 0x2). The second line is translated to push 0x9, since
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ff is the binary code of the instruction push. The third instruction mov 0x2
0xc will replace the first byte at address 0x2 by 0xc. Thus, at address 0x2,
ff 09 is replaced by 0c 09. This means the instruction push 0x9 is replaced
by the jump instruction jmp 0x9 (jump to address 0x9), etc. Therefore, this
code is self-modifying: the mov instruction was able to modify the instructions
of the program via its ability to read and write the memory. If we study this
code without looking at the semantics of the self-modifying instructions, we will
extract from it the Control Flow Graph CFG a that is in the left of the figure,
and we will reach the conclusion that the call to the API function CopyFileA at
address 0x9 cannot be made. However, you can see that the correct CFG is the
one on the right hand side CFG b, where the call to the API function CopyFileA
at address 0x9 can be reached. Thus, it is very important to be able to take into
account the semantics of the self-modifying instructions in binary code.
0x0 jmp 0x2
0x2 push 09
0x4 mov 0x2 0xc
0x7 jmp 0x2
0x0 jmp 0x2
0x2 jmp 09
0x4 mov 0x2 0xc
0x7 jmp 0x2
0x9 call CopyFileA
CFG a CFG b
0x9  call CopyFileA
CFGs
0x0      jmp 0x2
0x2      push 0x9
0x4     mov 0x2 0xc
0x7     jmp 0x2
0x9    call CopyFileA
 0c 02
 ff 09
c6 02 0c
 0c 02
e8 32 f6 ff ff
Binary Codes Assemblyaddress
Codes
0x2 push 09
    jmp 0x9
After Execution of
mov 0x2 0xc
Fig. 1: An Example of a Self-modifying Code
In this paper, we consider the LTL model-checking problem of self-modifying
code. To this aim, we use Self-Modifying Pushdown Systems (SM-PDSs) [29]
to model self-modifying code. Indeed, SM-PDSs were shown in [29] to be an
adequate model for self-modifying code since they allow to mimic the program’s
stack while taking into account the self-modifying semantics of the transitions.
This is very important for binary code analysis and malware detection, since
malwares are based on calls to API functions of the operating system. Thus,
antiviruses check the API calls to determine whether a program is malicious or
not. Therefore, to evade from these antiviruses, malware writers try to hide the
API calls they make by replacing calls by push and jump instructions. Thus,
to be able to analyse such malwares, it is crucial to be able to analyse the
program’s stack. Hence the need to a model like pushdown systems and self-
modifying pushdown systems for this purpose, since they allow to mimic the
program’s stack.
2
Intuitively, a SM-PDS is a pushdown system (PDS) with self-modifying rules,
i.e., with rules that allow to modify the current set of transitions during execu-
tion. This model was introduced in [29] in order to represent self-modifying code.
In [29], the authors have proposed algrithms to compute finite automata that
accept the forward and backward reachability sets of SM-PDSs. In this work,
we tackle the problem of LTL model-checking of SM-PDSs. Since SM-PDSs are
equivalent to PDSs [29], one possible approach for LTL model checking of SM-
PDS is to translate the SM-PDS to a standard PDS and then run the LTL
model checking algorithm on the equivalent PDS [2,10]. But translation from a
SM-PDS to a standard PDS is exponential. Thus, performing the LTL model
checking on the equivalent PDS is not efficient.
To overcome this limitation, we propose a direct LTL model checking algo-
rithm for SM-PDSs. Our algorithm is based on reducing the LTL model checking
problem to the emptiness problem of Self Modifying Bu¨chi Pushdown Systems
(SM-BPDS). Intuitively, we obtain this SM-BPDS by taking the product of the
SM-PDS with a Bu¨chi automaton accepting an LTL formula ϕ. Then, we solve
the emptiness problem of an SM-BPDS by computing its repeating heads. This
computation is based on computing labelled pre∗ configurations by applying a
saturation procedure on labelled finite automata.
We implemented our algorithm in a tool. Our experiments show that our
direct techniques are much more efficient than translating the SM-PDS to an
equivalent PDS and then applying the standard LTL model checking for PDSs
[2,10]. Moreover, we successfully applied our tool to the analysis of 892 self-
modifying malwares. Our tool was also able to detect several self-modifying
malwares that well-known antiviruses like BitDefender, Kinsoft, Avira, eScan,
Kaspersky, Qihoo-360, Baidu, Avast, and Symantec were not able to detect.
Related Work. Model checking and static analysis approaches have been widely
used to analyze binary programs, for instance, in [9,5,23,11,3]. Temporal Logics
were chosen to describe malicious behaviors in [20,11,3,4,8]. However, these works
cannot deal with self-modifying code.
POMMADE [3,4] is a malware detector based on LTL and CTL model-
checking of PDSs. STAMAD [15,16,14] is a malware detector based on PDSs
and machine learning. However, POMMADE and STAMAD cannot deal with
self-modifying code.
Cai et al. [7] use local reasoning and separation logic to describe self-modifying
code and treat program code uniformly as regular data structure. However, [7]
requires programs to be manually annotated with invariants. In [26], the au-
thors propose a formal semantics for self-modifying codes, and use that to repre-
sent self-unpacking code. This work only deals with packing and unpacking be-
haviours. Bonfante et al. [6] provide an operational semantics for self-modifying
programs and show that they can be constructively rewritten to a non-modifying
program. However, all these specifications [6,7,26] are too abstract to be used in
practice.
In [1], the authors propose a new representation of self-modifying code named
State Enhanced-Control Flow Graph (SE-CFG). SE-CFG extends standard con-
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trol flow graphs with a new data structure, keeping track of the possible states
programs can reach, and with edges that can be conditional on the state of the
target memory location. It is not easy to analyse a binary program only using its
SE-CFG, especially that this representation does not allow to take into account
the stack of the program.
[24] propose abstract interpretation techniques to compute an over-approximation
of the set of reachable states of a self-modifying program, where for each control
point of the program, an over-approximation of the memory state at this control
point is provided. [18] combine static and dynamic analysis techniques to analyse
self-modifying programs. Unlike our approach, these techniques [24,18] cannot
handle the program’s stack.
Unpacking binary code is also considered in [13,17,22,26]. These works do
not consider self-modifying mov instructions.
Outline. The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 recalls
the definition of Self Modifying pushdown systems. LTL model checking and
SM-BPDSs are defined in Section 3. Section 4 solves the emptiness problem of
SM-BPDS. Finally, the experiments are reported in Section 5.
2 Self Modifying Pushdown Systems
2.1 Definition
We recall in this section the definition of Self-modifying Pushdown Systems [29].
Definition 1. A Self-modifying Pushdown System (SM-PDS) is a tuple P =
(P, Γ,∆,∆c), where P is a finite set of control points, Γ is a finite set of stack
symbols, ∆ ⊆ (P × Γ ) × (P × Γ ∗) is a finite set of transition rules, and ∆c ∈
P×∆×∆×P is a finite set of modifying transition rules. If ((p, γ), (p′, w)) ∈ ∆,
we also write 〈p, γ〉 ↪→ 〈p′, w〉 ∈ ∆. If (p, r1, r2, p′) ∈ ∆c, we also write p
(r1,r2)
↪−−−−→
p′ ∈ ∆c. A Pushdown System (PDS) is a SM-PDS where ∆c = ∅.
Intuitively, a Self-modifying Pushdown System is a Pushdown System that
can dynamically modify its set of rules during the execution time: rules ∆ are
standard PDS transition rules, while rules ∆c modify the current set of transition
rules: 〈p, γ〉 ↪→ 〈p′, w〉 ∈ ∆ expresses that if the SM-PDS is in control point p
and has γ on top of its stack, then it can move to control point p′, pop γ and
push w onto the stack, while p
(r1,r2)
↪−−−−→ p′ ∈ ∆c expresses that when the PDS is
in control point p, then it can move to control point p′, remove the rule r1 from
its current set of transition rules, and add the rule r2.
Formally, a configuration of a SM-PDS is a tuple c = (〈p, w〉, θ) where p ∈ P
is the control point, w ∈ Γ ∗ is the stack content, and θ ⊆ ∆ ∪∆c is the current
set of transition rules of the SM-PDS. θ is called the current phase of the SM-
PDS. When the SM-PDS is a PDS, i.e., when ∆c = ∅, a configuration is a tuple
c = (〈p, w〉, ∆), since there is no changing rule, so there is only one possible phase.
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In this case, we can also write c = 〈p, w〉. Let C be the set of configurations of
a SM-PDS. A SM-PDS defines a transition relation ⇒P between configurations
as follows: Let c = (〈p, w〉, θ) be a configuration, and let r be a rule in θ, then:
1. if r ∈ ∆c is of the form r = p
(r1,r2)
↪−−−−→ p′, such that r1 ∈ θ, then (〈p, w〉, θ)⇒P
(〈p′, w〉, θ′), where θ′ = (θ \ {r1}) ∪ {r2}. In other words, the transition rule
r updates the current set of transition rules θ by removing r1 from it and
adding r2 to it.
2. if r ∈ ∆ is of the form r = 〈p, γ〉 ↪→ 〈p′, w′〉 ∈ ∆, then (〈p, γw〉, θ) ⇒P
(〈p′, w′w〉, θ). In other words, the transition rule r moves the control point
from p to p′, pops γ from the stack and pushes w′ onto the stack. This
transition keeps the current set of transition rules θ unchanged.
Let ⇒∗P be the transitive, reflexive closure of ⇒P and ⇒+P be its transitive
closure. An execution (a run) of P is a sequence of configurations pi = c0c1...
s.t. ci ⇒P ci+1 for every i ≥ 0. Given a configuration c, the set of immedi-
ate predecessors (resp. successors) of c is preP(c) = {c′ ∈ C : c′ ⇒P c}
(resp. postP(c) = {c′ ∈ C : c ⇒P c′}). These notations can be generalized
straightforwardly to sets of configurations. Let pre∗P (resp. post
∗
P) denote the
reflexive-transitive closure of preP (resp. postP). We remove the subscript P
when it is clear from the context.
We suppose w.l.o.g. that rules in ∆ are of the form 〈p, γ〉 ↪→ 〈p′, w〉 such that
|w| ≤ 2, and that the self-modifying rules r = p (r1,r2)↪−−−−→ p′ in ∆c are such that
r 6= r1. Note that this is not a restriction, since for a given SM-PDS, one can
compute an equivalent SM-PDS that satisfies these conditions [29] .
2.2 SM-PDS vs. PDS
Let P = (P, Γ,∆,∆c) be a SM-PDS. It was shown in [29] that:
1. P can be described by an equivalent pushdown system (PDS). Indeed, since
the number of phases is finite, we can encode phases in the control point
of the PDS. However, this translation is not efficient since the number of
control points of the equivalent PDS is |P | · 2O(|∆|+|∆c|).
2. P can also be described by an equivalent Symbolic pushdown system [27],
where each SM-PDS rule is represented by a single, symbolic transition,
where the different values of the phases are encoded in a symbolic way using
relations between phases. This translation is not efficient neither since the
size of the relations used in the symbolic transitions is 2O(|∆|+|∆c|).
2.3 From Self-modifying Code to SM-PDS
It is shown in [29] how to describe a self-modifying binary code using a SM-PDS.
The basic idea is that the control locations of the SM-PDS store the control
points of the binary program and the stack mimics the program’s stack. Our
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translation relies on the disassembler Jakstab [12] to disassemble binary code,
construct the control flow graph (CFG), determine indirect jumps, compute the
possible values of used variables, registers and the memory locations at each
control point of program. After getting the control flow graph whose edges are
equipped with disassembled instructions, we translate the CFG into a SM-PDS
as described in [29]. The non self-modifying instructions of the program define
the rules ∆ of the SM-PDS (which are standard PDS rules), and can be obtained
following the translation of [3] that models non self-modifying instructions of
the program by a PDS. Self-modifying instructions are represented using self-
modifying transitions ∆c of the SM-PDS. For more details, we refer the reader
to [29].
3 LTL Model-Checking of SM-PDSs
3.1 The linear-time temporal logic LTL
Let At be a finite set of atomic propositions. LTL formulas are defined as follows
(where A ∈ At):
ϕ := A | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2| Xϕ | ϕ1Uϕ2
Formulae are interpreted on infinite words over 2At. Let ω = ω0ω1... be an
infinite word over 2At. We write ωi for the suffix of ω starting at ω
i. We denote
ω |= ϕ to express that ω satisfies a formula ϕ:
ω |= A ⇐⇒ A ∈ ω0
ω |= ¬ϕ ⇐⇒ ω 2 ϕ
ω |= ϕ1∨ϕ2 ⇐⇒ ω |= ϕ1 or ω |= ϕ2
ω |= Xϕ ⇐⇒ ω1 |= ϕ
ω |= ϕ1Uϕ2 ⇐⇒ ∃i ≥ 0, ωi |= ϕ2 and ∀0 ≤ j < i, ωj |= ϕ1
The temporal operators G (globally) and F (eventually) are defined as fol-
lows: Fϕ = (A ∨ ¬A)Uϕ and Gϕ = ¬F¬ϕ. Let W (ϕ) be the set of infinite words
that satisfy an LTL formula ϕ. It is well known that W (ϕ) can be accepted by
Bu¨chi automata:
Definition 2. A Bu¨chi automaton B is a quintuple (Q,Γ, η, q0, F ) where Q is
a finite set of states, Γ is a finite input alphabet, η ⊆ (Q × Γ × Q) is a set
of transitions, q0 ∈ Q is the initial state and F ⊆ Q is the set of accepting
states. A run of B on a word γ0γ1... ∈ Γω is a sequence of states q0q1q2... s.t.
∀i ≥ 0, (qi, γi, qi+1) ∈ η. An infinite word ω is accepted by B if B has a run on
ω that starts at q0 and visits accepting states from F infinitely often.
Theorem. [19] Given an LTL formula ϕ, one can effectively construct a Bu¨chi
automaton Bϕ which accepts W (ϕ).
3.2 Self Modifying Bu¨chi Pushdown Systems
Definition 3. A Self Modifying Bu¨chi Pushdown Systems (SM-BPDS) is a tu-
ple BP = (P, Γ,∆,∆c, G) where P is a set of control locations, G ⊆ P is a set
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of accepting control locations, ∆ ⊆ (P ×Γ )×(P ×Γ ∗) is a finite set of transition
rules, and ∆c ⊆ P × 2∆∪∆c × 2∆∪∆c × P is a finite set of modifying transition
rules in the form p
(σ,σ′)
↪−−−−→ p′ where σ, σ′ ⊆ ∆ ∪∆c.
Let ⇒BP be the transition relation between configurations as follows: Let
θ ⊆ ∆ ∪∆c, γ ∈ Γ,w ∈ Γ ∗, and p ∈ P , then
1. If r : 〈p, γ〉 ↪→ 〈p′, w′〉 ∈ ∆ and r ∈ θ, then (〈p, γw〉, θ)⇒BP (〈p′, w′w〉, θ).
2. If r : p
(σ,σ′)
↪−−−−→ p′ ∈ ∆c, σ ∩ θ 6= ∅ and r ∈ θ, then (〈p, γw〉, θ) ⇒BP
(〈p′, γw〉, θ′) where θ′ = θ\σ ∪ σ′.
A run pi of BP is a sequence of configurations pi = c0c1... s.t. ci ⇒BP ci+1
for every i ≥ 0. pi is accepting iff it infinitely often visits configurations having
control locations in G.
Let c and c′ be two configurations of the SM-BPDS BP. The relation ⇒rBP
is defined as follows: c ⇒rBP c′ iff there exists a configuration (〈g, u〉, θ), g ∈ G
s.t. c ⇒∗BP (〈g, u〉, θ) ⇒+BP c′. We remove the subscript BP when it is clear
from the context. We define
i⇒ as follows: c i⇒ c′ iff there exists a sequence of
configurations c0 ⇒BP c1 ⇒BP ...⇒BP ci s.t. c0 = c and ci = c′.
A head of SM-BPDS is a tuple (〈p, γ〉, θ) where p ∈ P , γ ∈ Γ and θ ⊆ ∆∪∆c.
A head ((p, γ), θ) is repeating if there exists v ∈ Γ ∗ such that (〈p, γ〉, θ) ⇒rBP
(〈p, γv〉, θ). The set of repeating heads of SM-BPDS is called RepBP .
We assume w.l.o.g. that for every rule in ∆c of the form r : p
(σ,σ′)
↪−−−−→ p′,
r /∈ σ.
3.3 From LTL Model-Checking of SM-PDSs to the emptiness
problem of SM-BPDSs
Let P = (P, Γ,∆,∆c) be a self modifying pushdown system. Let At be a set
of atomic propositions. Let ν : P → 2At be a labelling function. Let pi =
(〈p0, w0〉, θ0)(〈p1, w1〉, θ1)... be an execution of the SM-PDS P. Let ϕ be an LTL
formula over the set of atomic propositions At. We say that
pi |=ν ϕ iff ν(p0)ν(p1) · · · |= ϕ
Let (〈p, w〉, θ) be a configuration of P. We say that (〈p, w〉, θ) |=ν ϕ iff P has
a path pi starting at (〈p, w〉, θ) such that pi |=ν ϕ.
Our goal in this paper is to perform LTL model-checking for self-modifying
pushdown systems. Since SM-PDSs can be translated to standard (symbolic)
pushdown systems, one way to solve this LTL model-checking problem is to
compute the (symbolic) pushdown system that is equivalent to the SM-PDS
(see section 2.2), and then apply the standard LTL model-checking algorithms on
standard PDSs [27]. However, this approach is not efficient (as will be witnessed
later in the experiments). Thus, we need a direct approach that performs LTL
model-checking on the SM-PDS, without translating it to an equivalent PDS. Let
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Bϕ = (Q, 2At, η, q0, F ) be a Bu¨chi automaton that accepts W (ϕ). We compute
the SM-BPDS BPϕ = (P × Q,Γ,∆′, ∆′c, G) by performing a kind of product
between the SM-PDS P and the Bu¨chi automaton Bϕ as follows:
1. if r = 〈p, γ〉 ↪→ 〈p′, w〉 ∈ ∆ and (q, ν(p), q′) ∈ η, then 〈(p, q), γ〉 ↪→ 〈(p′, q′), w〉 ∈
∆′. Let prod(r) be the set of rules of ∆′ obtained from the rule r, i.e., rules
of ∆′ of the form 〈(p, q), γ〉 ↪→ 〈(p′, q′), w〉.
2. if a rule r = p
(r1,r2)
↪−−−−→ p′ ∈ ∆c and (q, ν(p), q′) ∈ η, then (p, q)
(σ,σ′)
↪−−−−→
(p′, q′) ∈ ∆′c where σ = prod(r1), σ′ = prod(r2). Let prod(r) be the set of
rules of∆′ obtained from the rule r, i.e., rules of∆′c of the form (p, q)
(σ,σ′)
↪−−−−→
(p′, q′).
3. G = P × F .
We can show that:
Theorem 1. Let (〈p, w〉, θ) be a configuration of the SM-PDS P. (〈p, w〉, θ) |=ν
ϕ iff BPϕ has an accepting run from (〈(p, q0), w〉, prod(θ)) where prod(θ) is the
set of rules of ∆ ∪∆c obtained from the rules of θ as described above.
Thus, LTL model-checking for SM-PDSs can be reduced to checking whether
a SM-BPDS has an accepting run. The rest of the paper is devoted to this
problem.
4 The Emptiness Problem of SM-BPDSs
From now on, we fix a SM-BPDS BP = (P, Γ,∆,∆c, G). We can show that BP
has an accepting run starting from a configuration c if and only if from c, it can
reach a configuration with a repeating head:
Proposition 1. A SM-BPDS BP has an accepting run starting from a con-
figuration c if and only if there exists a repeating head ((p, γ), θ) such that
c⇒∗BP (〈p, γw〉, θ) for some w ∈ Γ ∗.
Proof: “ ⇒ ”: Let σ = c0c1... be an accepting run starting at configuration
c where c0 = c and ci = (〈pi, wi〉, θi). We construct an increasing sequence
of indices i0, i1... with a property that once any of the configurations cik is
reached, the rest of the run never changes the bottom |wik |−1 elements of the
stack anymore. This property can be written as follows:
|wi0 |= min{|wj | | j ≥ 0}
|wik |= min{|wj | | j > ik−1}, k ≥ 1
Because BP has only finitely many different heads, there must be a head (〈p, γ〉, θ)
which occurs infinitely often as a head in the sequence ci0ci1 .... Moreover, as
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some g ∈ G becomes a control location infinitely often, we can find a subse-
quence of indices ij0 , ij1 , ... with the following property: for every k ≥ 1, there
exist v, w ∈ Γ ∗
cijk = (〈p, γw〉, θ)⇒r (〈p, γvw〉, θ) = cijk+1
Because w is never looked at or changed in this path, we can have (〈p, γ〉, θ)⇒r
(〈p, γv〉, θ). This proves this direction of the proposition.
“ ⇐ ”: Because (〈p, γ〉, θ) is a repeating head, we can construct the following
run for some u, v, w ∈ Γ ∗, θ′ ⊆ (∆ ∪∆c) and g ∈ G:
c⇒∗ (〈p, γw〉, θ)⇒∗ (〈g, uw〉, θ′)⇒+ (〈p, γvw〉, θ)⇒∗ (〈g, uvw〉, θ′)⇒+ (〈p, γvvw〉, θ)⇒∗ ...
Since g occurs infinitely often, the run is accepting. 2
Thus, since there exists an efficient algorithm to compute the pre∗ of SM-
PDSs [29], the emptiness problem of a SM-BPDS can be reduced to computing
its repeating heads.
4.1 The Head Reachability Graph G
Our goal is to compute the set of repeating heads RepBP , i.e., the set of heads
(〈p, γ〉, θ) such that there exists v ∈ Γ ∗, (〈p, γ〉, θ)⇒r (〈p, γv〉, θ). I.e., (〈p, γ〉, θ)⇒∗
(〈p, γv〉, θ) s.t. this path goes through an accepting location in G. To this aim,
we will compute a finite graph G whose nodes are the heads of BP of the form
((p, γ), θ), where p ∈ P , γ ∈ Γ and θ ⊆ ∆∪∆c; and whose edges encode the reach-
ability relation between these heads. More precisely, given two heads ((p, γ), θ)
and ((p′, γ′), θ′), ((p, γ), θ) b−→ ((p′, γ′), θ′) is an edge of the graph G means that
the configuration (〈p, γ〉, θ) can reach a configuration having (〈p′, γ′〉, θ′) as head,
i.e., it means that there exists v ∈ Γ ∗ s.t. (〈p, γ〉, θ)⇒∗ (〈p′, γ′v〉, θ′). Moreover,
we need to keep the information whether this path visits an accepting location in
G or not. This information is recorded in the label of the edge b: b = 1 means that
the path visits an accepting location in G, i.e. that (〈p, γ〉, θ) ⇒r (〈p′, γ′v〉, θ′).
Otherwise, b = 0. Therefore, if the graph G contains a loop from a head ((p, γ), θ)
to itself such that this loop goes through an edge labelled by 1, then ((p, γ), θ)
is a repeating head. Thus, computing RepBP can be reduced to computing the
graph G and finding 1-labelled loops in this graph.
More precisely, we define the head reachability graph G as follows:
Definition 4. The head reachability graph G is a tuple (P×Γ×2∆∪∆c , {0, 1}, δ)
such that ((p, γ), θ)
b−→ ((p′, γ′), θ′) is an edge of δ iff:
1. there exists a transition rc : p
(σ,σ′)
↪−−−−→ p′ ∈ θ ∩∆c, γ = γ′, θ′ = θ \ σ ∪ σ′,
and b = 1 iff p ∈ G;
2. there exists a transition 〈p, γ〉 ↪→ 〈p′, γ′〉 ∈ θ ∩∆, θ = θ′ and b = 1 iff p ∈ G;
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3. there exists a transition 〈p, γ〉 ↪→ 〈p′′, γ1γ′〉 ∈ θ ∩ ∆, for γ1 ∈ Γ , p′′ ∈ P ,
s.t. (〈p′′, γ1〉, θ) ⇒∗BP (〈p′, 〉, θ′), and b = 1 iff p ∈ G or (〈p′′, γ1〉, θ) ⇒rBP
(〈p′, 〉, θ′)
Let G be the head reachability graph. We define −→
i
as follows: let ((p, γ), θ) and
((p′, γ′), θ′) be two heads of BP. We write ((p, γ), θ) −→
i
((p′, γ′), θ′) iff ∃ booleans
b1, b2...bi ∈ {0, 1}, ∃ heads ((pj , γj), θj), 0 ≤ j ≤ i s.t. G contains the following
path ((p0, γ0), θ0)
b1−→ ((p1, γ1), θ1) b2−→ ... bi−→ ((pi, γi), θi) where ((p0, γ0), θ0) =
((p, γ), θ) and ((pi, γi), θi) = ((p
′, γ′), θ′).
Let →∗ be the reflexive transitive closure of the graph relation b−→, and let →r
be defined as follows: Given two heads ((p, γ), θ) and ((p′, γ′), θ′), ((p, γ), θ)→r
((p′, γ′), θ′) iff there is in G a path between ((p, γ), θ) and ((p′, γ′), θ′) that goes
through a 1-labelled edge, i.e., iff there exist heads ((p1, γ1), θ1) and ((p2, γ2), θ2)
s.t. ((p, γ), θ)→∗ ((p1, γ1), θ1) 1−→ ((p2, γ2), θ2)→∗ ((p′, γ′), θ′).
We can show that:
Theorem 2. Let BP = (P, Γ,∆,∆c, G) be a self-modifying Bu¨chi pushdown
system, and let G be its corresponding head reachability graph. A head ((p, γ), θ)
of BP is repeating iff G has a loop on the node ((p, γ), θ) that goes through a
1-labeled edge.
To prove this theorem, we first need to prove the following lemma:
Lemma 1. The relations →∗ and →r have the following properties: For any
heads ((p, γ), θ1) and ((p
′, γ′), θ2):
(a) ((p, γ), θ1)→∗ ((p′, γ′), θ2) iff (〈p, γ〉, θ1)⇒∗ (〈p′, γ′v〉, θ2) for some v ∈ Γ ∗.
(b) ((p, γ), θ1)→r ((p′, γ′), θ2) iff (〈p, γ〉, θ1)⇒r (〈p′, γ′v〉, θ2) for some v ∈ Γ ∗.
Proof: “⇒”: Assume ((p, γ), θ1) −→
i
((p′, γ′), θ2). We proceed by induction on i.
(a) Basis. i = 0. In this case, ((p, γ), θ1) = ((p
′, γ′), θ2), then we can get
(〈p, γ〉, θ1)⇒∗ (〈p, γ〉, θ1) = (〈p′, γ′〉, θ2)
Step. i > 0. Then there exist p1 ∈ P, γ′′ ∈ Γ ∗ and θ′ ⊆ ∆ ∪∆c such that
((p, γ), θ1) −→
1
((p1, γ
′′), θ′) −−→
i−1
((p′, γ′), θ2). From the induction hypothesis,
there exists u ∈ Γ ∗ such that (〈p1, γ′′〉, θ′)⇒∗ (〈p′, γ′u〉, θ2)
Since ((p, γ), θ1) → ((p1, γ′′), θ′), we have (〈p, γ〉, θ1) ⇒∗ (〈p1, γ′′w〉, θ′) for
w ∈ Γ ∗, hence (〈p, γ〉, θ1)⇒∗ (〈p′, γ′uw〉, θ2).
The property holds.
(b) ((p, γ), θ1)→r ((p, γ), θ1) cannot hold for the case i = 0.
Basis. i = 1. In this case, ((p, γ), θ1)→r ((p′, γ′), θ2), then we can get p ∈ G
and (〈p, γ〉, θ1)⇒r (〈p′, γ′〉, θ2). The property holds.
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Step. i > 0. As done in the proof of part (a) of this lemma, there exists
p1, γ
′′ ∈ Γ, θ′′ ⊆ ∆ ∪ ∆c s.t. ((p, γ), θ1) −→
1
((p1, γ
′′), θ′) −−→
i−1
((p′, γ′), θ2).
Then if ((p, γ), θ1) →r ((p′, γ′), θ2), either ((p1, γ′′), θ′) →r ((p′, γ′), θ2) or
((p, γ), θ1)
1−→ ((p1, γ′′), θ′) holds. In the first case i.e. ((p1, γ′′), θ′)→r ((p′, γ′), θ2),
by the induction hypothesis, we can have (〈p1, γ′′〉, θ′) ⇒r (〈p′, γ′u〉, θ2),
hence, (〈p, γ〉, θ1)⇒r (〈p′, γ′u〉, θ2) holds
The second case depends on the rule applied to get ((p, γ), θ1)
1−→ ((p1, γ′′), θ′)
according to Definition 4.
- If this edge corresponds to a transition rc : p
(σ,σ′)
↪−−−−→ p1 ∈ θ1, then
γ = γ′′, θ′ = θ1\σ ∪ σ′ and p ∈ G. Since we can obtain (〈p, γ〉, θ1) ⇒BP
(〈p1, γ〉, θ′)⇒∗ (〈p′, γ′uw〉, θ2) from part (a) and p ∈ G, then (〈p, γ〉, θ1)⇒r
(〈p1, γ〉, θ′)⇒∗ (〈p′, γ′uw〉, θ2). This implies that (〈p, γ〉, θ1)⇒r (〈p′, γ′v〉, θ2)
for some v ∈ Γ ∗.
- If this edge corresponds to a transition r : 〈p, γ〉 ↪→ 〈p1, γ′′〉 ∈ θ1∩∆, then
θ′ = θ1 and p ∈ G. Since we can obtain (〈p, γ〉, θ1)⇒BP (〈p1, γ′′〉, θ1)⇒∗
(〈p′, γ′uw〉, θ2) from part (a) and p ∈ G, then (〈p, γ〉, θ1)⇒r (〈p1, γ′′〉, θ1)⇒∗
(〈p′, γ′uw〉, θ2). This implies that (〈p, γ〉, θ1) ⇒r (〈p′, γ′v〉, θ2) for some
v ∈ Γ ∗.
- If this edge corresponds to a transition r : 〈p, γ〉 ↪→ 〈p′′, γ1γ′′〉 ∈ θ1,
then either p ∈ G or (〈p′′, γ1〉, θ1) ⇒r (〈p1, 〉, θ′) holds. If p ∈ G, then
we have (〈p, γ〉, θ1) ⇒r (〈p′′, γ1γ′′〉, θ1). Otherwise, (〈p′′, v1γ′′w〉, θ1) ⇒r
(〈p1, γ′′w〉, θ′). Since we can obtain (〈p1, γ′′〉, θ′) ⇒∗ (〈p′, γ′u〉, θ2) from
part (a). Therefore, (〈p, γ〉, θ1) ⇒r (〈p1, γ′′〉, θ′) ⇒∗ (〈p′, γ′u〉, θ2). This
implies that (〈p, γ〉, θ1)⇒r (〈p′, γ′v〉, θ2) for some v ∈ Γ ∗.
‘⇐”: Assume (〈p, γ〉, θ1) i⇒ (〈p′, γ′v〉, θ2). We proceed by induction on i.
(a) Basis. i = 0. In this case, v =  and (〈p, γ〉, θ1) = (〈p′, γ′〉, θ2), then
((p, γ), θ1)→∗ ((p′, γ′), θ2) holds.
Step. i > 0. Then there exist p1 ∈ P, u ∈ Γ ∗ and θ′ ⊆ ∆ ∪ ∆c such that
(〈p, γ〉, θ1) 1⇒ (〈p1, u〉, θ′) i−1⇒ (〈p′, γ′v〉, θ2). There are 2 cases:
1. Case θ′ = θ1 : There must exist a rule r : 〈p, γ〉 ↪→ 〈p1, u〉 ∈ ∆ such that
r ∈ θ′ and |u| ≥ 1. Let l denote the minimal length of the stack on the
path from (〈p1, u〉, θ1) to (〈p′, γ′v〉, θ2). Then u can be written as u′′γ1u′
where |u′| = l− 1 (that means u′ will remain on the stack for the path).
Furthermore, there exists p′′′ such that (〈p1, u′′〉, θ1)⇒∗ (〈p′′′, 〉, θ′′) for
some θ′′ ⊆ (∆c∪∆). We have (〈p, γ〉, θ1) k⇒ (〈p′′′, γ1u′〉, θ′′) for k < i. By
the induction on i, we have ((p, γ), θ1)→∗ ((p′′′, γ1), θ′′). Because u′ has
to remain on the stack for the rest of the path, v is of the form v′u′ for
some v′ ∈ Γ ∗. That means (〈p′′′, γ1〉, θ′′) j⇒ (〈p′, γ′v′〉, θ2) for j < i. By
the induction hypothesis, ((p′′′, γ1), θ′′)→∗ ((p′, γ′), θ2) holds. Moreover,
we have ((p, γ), θ1)→∗ ((p′′′, γ1), θ′′), hence ((p, γ), θ1)→∗ ((p′, γ′), θ2).
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2. Case θ′ 6= θ1 : There must be a rule rc : p
(σ,σ′)
↪−−−−→ p1 ∈ ∆c such that
rc ∈ θ1 and σ ∩ θ1 6= ∅, then θ′ = θ1 \ σ ∪ σ′. After the execution of
rc, the content of the stack will remain the same, thus, u = γ. Then
(〈p, γ〉, θ1) 1⇒ (〈p1, γ〉, θ′) i−1⇒ (〈p′, γ′v〉, θ2). By the induction hypothe-
sis to (〈p1, γ〉, θ′) i−1⇒ (〈p′, γ′v〉, θ2), we can obtain that ((p1, γ), θ′) →∗
((p′, γ′), θ2). Since (〈p, γ〉, θ1) 1⇒ (〈p1, γ〉, θ′), then we can have a path
((p, γ), θ1) → ((p1, γ), θ′) →∗ ((p′, γ′), θ2) that implies ((p, γ), θ1) →∗
((p′, γ′), θ2). The property holds.
(b) (〈p, γ〉, θ1)⇒r (〈p, γ′v〉, θ1) is impossible in 0 steps.
Basis. i = 1. (〈p, γ〉, θ1) ⇒r (〈p, γ〉, θ1), then p ∈ G. Thus, ((p, γ), θ1) →r
((p, γ), θ1) holds.
Step. i > 1. (〈p, γ〉, θ1)⇒r (〈p′, γ′v〉, θ2) holds, then there exist p1 ∈ P, u ∈
Γ ∗ and θ′ ⊆ ∆ ∪ ∆c such that (〈p, γ〉, θ1) 1⇒ (〈p1, u〉, θ′) i−1⇒ (〈p′, γ′v〉, θ2).
Thus, either (〈p, γ〉, θ1)⇒r (〈p1, u〉, θ′) or (〈p1, u〉, θ′)⇒r (〈p′, γ′v〉, θ2) holds.
The first case implies p ∈ G. There are 2 cases:
1. Case θ′ = θ1 : then as in the previous proof of part (a), we can have a
path ((p, γ), θ1)→∗ ((p′′′, γ1), θ′′)→∗ ((p′, γ′), θ2). Since p ∈ G, we get
by Definition 4 ((p, γ), θ1) →∗ ((p′′′, γ1), θ′′) →∗ ((p′, γ′), θ2). Thus, we
have that ((p, γ), θ1)→r ((p′, γ′), θ2). The property holds.
2. Case θ′ 6= θ1: then as in the previous proof of part (a), we can have
a path ((p, γ), θ1) → ((p1, γ), θ′) →∗ ((p′, γ′), θ2). Since p ∈ G, we get
((p, γ), θ1)
1−→ ((p1, γ), θ′)→∗ ((p′, γ′), θ2). Thus, we have that ((p, γ), θ1)→r
((p′, γ′), θ2). The property holds.
In the second case, (〈p1, u〉, θ′) ⇒r (〈p′, γ′v〉, θ2) holds. As previously, there
are 2 cases:
1. Case θ′ = θ1 : then as in case (a) we have (〈p1, u〉, θ1)⇒∗ (〈p′′′, γ1u′〉, θ′′)
and (〈p′′′, γ1〉, θ′′) ⇒∗ (〈p′, γ′v′〉, θ2). If (〈p1, u〉, θ1) ⇒r (〈p′, γ′v〉, θ2),
then either (〈p1, u〉, θ1)⇒r (〈p′′′, γ1u′〉, θ′′) or (〈p′′′, γ1〉, θ′′)⇒r (〈p′, γ′v′〉, θ2).
- If (〈p1, u〉, θ1) ⇒r (〈p′′′, γ1u′〉, θ′′), let u′′ ∈ Γ ∗ s.t. u = u′′γ1u′
and (〈p1, u′′〉, θ1) ⇒r (〈p′′′, 〉, θ′′), then, we have ((p, γ), θ1) →r
((p′′′, γ1), θ′′). We have (〈p, γ〉, θ1) k⇒ (〈p′′′, γ1u′〉, θ′′) for k < i. By
the induction on i, we have ((p, γ), θ1)→∗ ((p′′′, γ1), θ′′). Because u′
has to remain on the stack for the rest of the path, v is of the form v′u′
for some v′ ∈ Γ ∗. That means (〈p′′′, γ1〉, θ′′) j⇒ (〈p′, γ′v′〉, θ2) for j <
i. By the induction hypothesis, ((p′′′, γ1), θ′′) →∗ ((p′, γ′), θ2) holds.
Moreover, we have ((p, γ), θ1)→∗ ((p′′′, γ1), θ′′), hence ((p, γ), θ1)→∗
((p′, γ′), θ2). So we can have a path ((p, γ), θ1)→∗ ((p′′′, γ1), θ′′)→∗
((p′, γ′), θ2), thus we have that ((p, γ), θ1)→r ((p′, γ′), θ2);
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- If (〈p′′′, γ1〉, θ′′) ⇒r (〈p′, γ′v′〉, θ2), then by the induction hypoth-
esis we have ((p′′′, γ1), θ′′) →r ((p′, γ′), θ2). Thus, we can have a
path ((p, γ), θ1)→∗ ((p′′′, γ1), θ′′)→∗ ((p′, γ′), θ2), then we have that
((p, γ), θ1)→r ((p′, γ′), θ2);
2. Case θ′ 6= θ1 : then (〈p1, γ〉, θ′) ⇒r (〈p′, γ′v〉, θ2). By the induction
hypothesis we have ((p1, γ), θ
′) →r ((p′, γ′), θ2). Since (〈p, γ〉, θ1) 1⇒
(〈p1, γ〉, θ′) i−1⇒ (〈p′, γ′v〉, θ2).
By the induction hypothesis to (〈p1, γ〉, θ′) i−1⇒ (〈p′, γ′v〉, θ2), we can
obtain that ((p1, γ), θ
′)→∗ ((p′, γ′), θ2). Since (〈p, γ〉, θ1) 1⇒ (〈p1, γ〉, θ′),
then we can have a path ((p, γ), θ1)→ ((p1, γ), θ′)→∗ ((p′, γ′), θ2). Thus,
we have that ((p, γ), θ1)→r ((p′, γ′), θ2);
Thus, the property holds.
2
Proof of Theorem 2
We can now prove Theorem 2.
Proof: Let ((p, γ), θ) be a repeating head, then there exists some v ∈ Γ ∗, θ ⊆
∆c ∪∆ such that (〈p, γ〉, θ)⇒r (〈p, γv〉, θ). By Lemma 1, this is the case if and
only if ((p, γ), θ)→r ((p, γ), θ). From the definition of→r, that means that there
exist heads ((p1, γ1), θ
′) and ((p2, γ2), θ′′) such that ((p, γ), θ)→∗ ((p1, γ1), θ′) 1−→
((p2, γ2), θ
′′)→∗ ((p, γ), θ). Then ((p, γ), θ), ((p1, γ1), θ′) and ((p2, γ2), θ′′) are all
in the same loop with a 1-labelled edge. Conversely, whenever ((p, γ), θ) is in a
component with such an edge, ((p, γ), θ) →r ((p, γ), θ) holds, then Lemma 1
implies that (〈p, γ〉, θ)⇒r (〈p, γv〉, θ) which means that ((p, γ), θ) is a repeating
head.
2
4.2 Labelled configurations and labelled BP-automata
To compute G, we need to be able to compute predecessors of configurations of
the form (〈p′, 〉, θ′), and to determine whether these predecessors were backward-
reachable using some control points in G (item 3 in Definition 4). To solve this
question, we will label configurations (〈p′′, w〉, θ) s.t. (〈p′′, w〉, θ) ⇒∗ (〈p′, 〉, θ′)
by 1 if this path went through an accepting location in G, i.e., if (〈p′′, w〉, θ)⇒r
(〈p′, 〉, θ′), and by 0 if not. To this aim, we define a labelled configuration as a
tuple [(〈p, w〉, θ), b], s.t. (〈p, w〉, θ) is a configuration and b ∈ {0, 1}.
Multi-automata were introduced in [2,10] to finitely represent regular infinite
sets of configurations of a PDS. Since a labelled configuration c = [(〈p, w〉, θ), b]
of a SM-PDS involves a PDS configuration 〈p, w〉, together with the current set
of transition rules (phase) θ, and a boolean b, in order to take into account the
phases θ, and these new 0/1-labels in configurations, we extend multi-automata
to labelled BP-automata as follows:
Definition 5. Let BP = (P, Γ,∆,∆c, G) be a SM-BPDS. A labelled BP-automaton
is a tuple A = (Q,Γ, T, I, F ) where Γ is the automaton alphabet, Q is a finite
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set of states, I ⊆ P × 2∆∪∆c ⊆ Q is the set of initial states, T ⊂ Q × ((Γ ∪
{})× {0, 1})×Q is the set of transitions, F ⊆ Q is the set of final states.
If
(
q, [γ, b], q′
) ∈ T , we write q [γ,b]−−−→T q′. We extend this notation in the obvious
way to sequences of symbols: (1) ∀q ∈ Q, q [,0]−−−→T q, and (2) ∀q, q′ ∈ Q,∀b ∈
{0, 1},∀w ∈ Γ ∗ for w = γ0...γn+1, q [w,b]−−−→T q′ iff ∃q0, ..., qn ∈ Q, b0, ..., bn+1 ∈
{0, 1}, b = b0∨b1∨ ...∨bn+1 and q [γ0,b0]−−−−−→T q0 [γ1,b1]−−−−−→T q1 · · · qn [γn+1,bn+1]−−−−−−−−→T q′. If
q
[w,b]−−−→T q′ holds, we say that q [w,b]−−−→T q′ and q [γ0,b0]−−−−−→T q0 [γ1,b1]−−−−−→T q1 · · · qn [γn+1,bn+1]−−−−−−−−→T q′
is a path of A.
A labelled configuration [(〈p, w〉, θ), b] is accepted by the automaton A iff
there exists a path (p, θ)
[γ0,b0]−−−−−→T q1 [γ1,b1]−−−−−→T q2 · · · qn [γn,bn]−−−−−→T qn+1 inA such that
w = γ0γ1 · · · γn, b = b0 ∨ b1 ∨ ... ∨ bn, (p, θ) ∈ I, and qn+1 ∈ F . Let L(A) be the
set of labelled configurations accepted by A.
4.3 Computing pre∗
(
(〈p′, 〉, θ′))
Given a configuration of the form (〈p′, 〉, θ′), our goal is to compute a labelled
BP-automaton Apre∗
(
(〈p′, 〉, θ′)) that accepts labelled configurations of the
form [c, b] where c is a configuration and b ∈ {0, 1} such that c ⇒∗ (〈p′, 〉, θ′)
(i.e., c ∈ pre∗((〈p′, 〉, θ′))) and b = 1 iff this path went through final control
points, i.e., c⇒r (〈p′, 〉, θ′). Otherwise, b = 0.
Let p ∈ P , we defineB(p) = 1 if p ∈ G andB(p) = 0 otherwise.Apre∗
(
(〈p′, 〉, θ′)) =
(Q,Γ, T, I, F ) is computed as follows: Initially, Q = I = F = {(p′, θ′)} and
T = ∅. We add to T transitions as follows:
α1: If r = 〈p, γ〉 ↪→ 〈p1, w〉 ∈ ∆. If there exists in T a path (p1, θ) [w,b]−−−→T q
(in case |w| = 0, we have w = ) with r ∈ θ. Then, add (p, θ) to I, and(
(p, θ), [γ,B(p) ∨ b], q) to T .
α2: if r = p
(σ,σ′)
↪−−−−→ p1 ∈ ∆c and there exists in T a transition (p1, θ) [γ,b]−−−→T q
with r ∈ θ, where γ ∈ Γ . Then add (p, θ′) to I, and ((p, θ′), [γ,B(p) ∨ b], q)
to T , for θ′ such that θ = θ′ \ σ ∪ σ′.
The procedure above terminates since there is a finite number of states and
phases. Note that by construction, F = {(p′, θ′)}, and, since initially Q =
{(p′, θ′)}, states of Apre∗
(
(〈p′, 〉, θ′)) are all of the form (p, θ) for p ∈ P and
θ ⊆ ∆ ∪∆c.
Let us explain the intuition behind rule (α1). Let r = 〈p, γ〉 ↪→ 〈p1, w〉 ∈ ∆. Let
c = (〈p1, ww′〉, θ) and c′ = (〈p, γw′〉, θ). Then, if c⇒∗ (〈p′, 〉, θ′), then necessar-
ily, c′ ⇒∗ (〈p′, 〉, θ′). Moreover, c′ ⇒r (〈p′, 〉, θ′) iff either c⇒r (〈p′, 〉, θ′) or p ∈
G (i.e. B(p) = 1). Thus, we would like that if the automaton Apre∗
(
(〈p′, 〉, θ′))
accepts the labelled configuration [c, b] (where b = 1 means c ⇒r (〈p′, 〉, θ′)),
then it should also accept the labelled configuration [c′, b ∨ B(p)] (b ∨ B(p) = 1
means c′ ⇒r (〈p′, 〉, θ′)). Thus, if the automaton Apre∗
(
(〈p′, 〉, θ′)) contains
14
a path of the form pi = (p1, θ)
[w,b1]−−−−→T q [w
′,b2]−−−−→T qf where qf ∈ F that ac-
cepts the labelled configuration [c, b], then the automaton should also accept the
labelled configuration [c′, b ∨ B(p)]. This configuration is accepted by the run
(p, θ)
[γ,B(p)∨b1]−−−−−−−−→T q [w
′,b2]−−−−−→T qf added by rule (α1).
Rule (α2) deals with modifying rules: Let r = p
(r1,r2)
↪−−−−→ p1 ∈ ∆c. Let
c = (〈p1, γw′〉, θ) and c′ = (〈p, γw′〉, θ′′) s.t. θ = θ′′\{r1} ∪ {r2}. Then, if
c ⇒∗ (〈p′, 〉, θ′), then necessarily, c′ ⇒∗ (〈p′, 〉, θ′). Moreover, c′ ⇒r (〈p′, 〉, θ′)
iff either c⇒r (〈p′, 〉, θ′) or p ∈ G (i.e. B(p) = 1). Thus, we need to impose that
if the automaton Apre∗
(
(〈p′, 〉, θ′)) contains a path of the form (p1, θ) [γ,b1]−−−→T
q
[w′,b2]−−−−→T qf (where qf ∈ F ) that accepts the labelled configuration [c, b], b =
b1∨b2 (b = 1 means c⇒r (〈p′, 〉, θ′)), then necessarily, the automatonApre∗
(
(〈p′, 〉, θ′))
should also accept the labelled configuration [c′, b ∨B(p)]. This configuration is
accepted by the run (p, θ′′)
[γ,B(p)∨b1]−−−−−−−→T q [w
′,b2]−−−−→T qf added by rule (α2).
Before proving that our construction is correct, we introduce the following
definition:
Definition 6. Let Apre∗
(
(〈p′, 〉, θ′)) = (Q,Γ, T, P, F ) be the labelled P-automaton
computed by the saturation procedure above. In this section, we use −→
i T
to denote
the transition relation of Apre∗
(
(〈p′, 〉, θ′)) obtained after adding i transitions
using the saturation procedure above. Let us notice that due to the fact that ini-
tially Q = {(p′, θ′)} and due to rules (α1) and (α2) that at step i add only
transitions of the form (p, θ)
γ−→T q for a state q that is already in the automaton
at step i−1, then, states of Apre∗
(
(〈p′, 〉, θ′)) are all of the form (p, θ) for p ∈ P
and θ ⊆ ∆ ∪∆c.
We can show that:
Lemma 2. Let p, p′′ ∈ P and θ, θ′′ ⊆ ∆ ∪∆c. Let w ∈ Γ ∗ and b ∈ {0, 1}. If a
path (p, θ)
[w,b]−−−→T (p′′, θ′′) is in Apre∗
(
(〈p′, 〉, θ′)), then (〈p, w〉, θ)⇒∗ (〈p′′, 〉, θ′′).
Moreover, if b = 1, then (〈p, w〉, θ)⇒r (〈p′′, 〉, θ′′).
Proof: Initially, the automaton contains no transitions. Let i be an index such
that (p, θ)
[w,b]−−−→
i T
(p′′, θ′′) holds. We proceed by induction on i.
Basis. i = 0, then (p′′, θ′′)
[,0]−−−→
0 T
(p′′, θ′′). This means p′′ = p′, θ′′ = θ′.
Since initially Q = {(p′, θ′)}, then (〈p′′, 〉, θ′′)⇒∗ (〈p′′, 〉, θ′′) always holds.
Step. i > 0. Let t =
(
(p1, θ1), [γ, b1], (p0, θ0)
)
be the i-th transition added to
Apre∗ and j be the number of times that t is used in the path (p, θ) [w,b]−−−→
i T
(p′′, θ′′).
The proof is by induction on j. If j = 0, then we have (p, θ)
[w,b]−−−→
i−1 T
(p′′, θ′′) in
the automaton, and we apply the induction hypothesis (induction on i) then
we obtain (〈p, w〉, θ) ⇒∗ (〈p′′, 〉, θ′′). So assume that j > 0. Then, there exist
u, v ∈ Γ ∗, b′, b′′ ∈ {0, 1} such that w = uγv, b = b′ ∨ b1 ∨ b′′ and
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(p, θ)
[u,b′]−−−→
i−1 T
(p1, θ1)
[γ,b1]−−−→
i T
(p0, θ0)
[v,b′′]−−−−→
i T
(p′′, θ′′) (1)
The application of the induction hypothesis (induction on i) to (p, θ)
[u,b′]−−−→
i−1 T
(p1, θ1) gives that
(〈p, u〉, θ)⇒∗ (〈p1, 〉, θ1), moreover, if b′ = 1, (〈p, u〉, θ)⇒r (〈p1, 〉, θ1) (2)
There are 2 cases depending on whether transition t was added by saturation
rule α1 or α2.
1. Case t was added by rule α1: There exist p2 ∈ P and w2 ∈ Γ ∗ such that
r = 〈p1, γ〉 ↪→ 〈p2, w2〉 ∈ ∆ ∩ θ1 (3)
and Apre∗ contains the following path:
pi′ = (p2, θ1)
[w2,b2]−−−−→
i−1 T
(p0, θ0)
[v,b′′]−−−−→
i T
(p′′, θ′′), b1 = b2 ∨B(p1) (4)
Applying the transition rule r, we get that
(〈p1, γv〉, θ1)⇒ (〈p2, w2v〉, θ1) (5)
By induction on j (since transition t is used j − 1 times in pi′), we get from
(4) that
(〈p2, w2v〉, θ1)⇒∗ (〈p′′, 〉, θ′′) moreover, if b2∨b′′ = 1, (〈p2, w2v〉, θ1)⇒r (〈p′′, 〉, θ′′)
(6)
Putting (2), (5) and (6) together, we can obtain that
(〈p, w〉, θ) = (〈p, uγv〉, θ)⇒∗ (〈p1, γv〉, θ1)⇒ (〈p2, w2v〉, θ1)⇒∗ (〈p′′, 〉, θ′′)
Furthermore, if b = b′ ∨ b1 ∨ b′′ = 1, then b′ = 1 or b1 ∨ b′′ = 1.
For the first case, b′ = 1, then we can have (〈p, u〉, θ) ⇒r (〈p1, 〉, θ1) from
(2). Thus, we can obtain that (〈p, uγv〉, θ) ⇒r (〈p1, γv〉, θ1) ⇒∗ (〈p′′, 〉, θ′′)
i.e. (〈p, w〉, θ)⇒r (〈p′′, 〉, θ′′).
The second case b1 ∨ b′′ = 1 i.e. B(p1) ∨ b2 ∨ b′′ = 1 implies that B(p1) = 1
(that means p1 ∈ G and (〈p1, γv〉, θ1) ⇒r (〈p′′, 〉, θ′′)) or b2 ∨ b′′ = 1 (that
implies (〈p2, w2v〉, θ1) ⇒r (〈p′′, 〉, θ′′) from (6)). Therefore, (〈p, w〉, θ1) ⇒r
(〈p′′, 〉, θ′′).
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2. Case t was added by rule α2 : there exist p2 ∈ P and θ2 ⊆ ∆∪∆c such that
r = p1
(σ,σ′)
↪−−−−→ p2 ∈ ∆c ∩ θ2, θ2 = (θ1\σ) ∪ σ′ (7)
and the following path in the current automaton ( self-modifying rule won’t
change the stack) with r ∈ θ2 :
(p2, θ2)
[γ,b′1]−−−→
i−1 T
(p0, θ0)
[v,b′′]−−−−→
i T
(p′′, θ′′), b1 = B(p1) ∨ b′1 (8)
Applying the transition rule, we can get from (7) that
(〈p1, γv〉, θ1)⇒ (〈p2, γv〉, θ2) (9)
We can apply the induction hypothesis (on j) to (8), and obtain
(〈p2, γv〉, θ2)⇒∗ (〈p′′, 〉, θ′′), moreover, if b′1∨b′′ = 1, (〈p2, γv〉, θ2)⇒r (〈p′′, 〉, θ′′)
(10)
From (2),(9) and (10), we get
(〈p, w〉, θ) = (〈p, uγv〉, θ)⇒∗ (〈p1, γv〉, θ1)⇒ (〈p2, γv〉, θ2)⇒∗ (〈p′′, 〉, θ′′)
Furthermore, if b = b′ ∨ b1 ∨ b′′ = 1 , then b′ = 1 or b1 ∨ b′′ = 1.
For the first case, b′ = 1, then we can have (〈p, u〉, θ) ⇒r (〈p1, 〉, θ1) from
(2). Thus, we can obtain that (〈p, uγv〉, θ) ⇒r (〈p1, γv〉, θ1) ⇒∗ (〈p′′, 〉, θ′′)
i.e. (〈p, w〉, θ)⇒r (〈p′′, 〉, θ′′). The second case b1 ∨ b′′ = 1 i.e. B(p1) ∨ b′1 ∨
b′′ = 1 implies that B(p1) = 1 (that means p1 ∈ G and (〈p1, γv〉, θ1) ⇒r
(〈p′, 〉, θ′)) or b′1 ∨ b′′ = 1 (that implies (〈p2, γv〉, θ2) ⇒r (〈p′′, 〉, θ′′) from
(10)) i.e. (〈p, w〉, θ1)⇒r (〈p′, 〉, θ′). Therefore, we can get that if b = 1, then
(〈p, w〉, θ1)⇒r (〈p′′, 〉, θ′′).
2
Lemma 3. If there is a labelled configuration [(〈p, w〉, θ), b] such that (〈p, w〉, θ)⇒∗
(〈p′, 〉, θ′), then there is a path (p, θ) [w,b]−−−→T (p′, θ′) in Apre∗
(
(〈p′, 〉, θ′)). More-
over, if (〈p, w〉, θ)⇒r (〈p′, 〉, θ′), then b = 1.
Proof: Assume (〈p, w〉, θ) i⇒ (〈p′, 〉, θ′). We proceed by induction on i.
Basis. i = 0. Then θ = θ′, p′ = p and w = . Initially, we have thatQ = {(p′, θ′)},
therefore, by the definition of →T , we have (p′, θ′) −→T (p′, θ′). We cannot have
(〈p′, 〉, θ′)⇒r (〈p′, 〉, θ′) in 0-step.
Step. i > 0. Then there exists a configuration (〈p′′, u〉, θ′′) such that
(〈p, w〉, θ)⇒ (〈p′′, u〉, θ′′) i−1⇒ (〈p′, 〉, θ′)
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We apply the induction hypothesis to (〈p′′, u〉, θ′′) i−1⇒ (〈p′, 〉, θ′), and obtain that
there exists inApre∗
(
(〈p′, 〉, θ′)) a path (p′′, θ′′) [u,b′′]−−−−→T (p′, θ′). If (〈p′′, u〉, θ′′)⇒r
(〈p′, 〉, θ′), b′′ = 1.
Let (p0, θ0) be a state of Apre∗ . Let w1, u1 ∈ Γ ∗, γ ∈ Γ, b′′0 , b′′1 ∈ {0, 1} be
such that w = γw1, u = u1w1, b
′′ = b′′0 ∨ b′′1 and
(p′′, θ′′)
[u1,b
′′
0 ]−−−−−→T (p0, θ0) [w1,b
′′
1 ]−−−−−→T (p′, θ′) (1)
There are two cases depending on which rule is applied to get (〈p, w〉, θ) ⇒
(〈p′′, u〉, θ′′).
1. Case (〈p, w〉, θ) ⇒ (〈p′′, u〉, θ′′) is obtained by a rule of the form: 〈p, γ〉 ↪→
〈p′′, u1〉 ∈ ∆. In this case, θ′′ = θ. By the saturation rule α1, we have
(p, θ′′) [γ,b0]−−−−→T (p0, θ0), b0 = B(p) ∨ b′′0 (2)
Putting (1) and (2) together, we can obtain that
pi = (p, θ′′) [γ,b0]−−−−→T (p0, θ0) [w1,b
′′
1 ]−−−−−→T (p′, θ′) (3)
Thus, (p, θ′′)
[γw1,b0∨b′′1 ]−−−−−−−−→T (p′, θ′) i.e. (p, θ) [w,b]−−−→T (p′, θ′) where b = b0 ∨ b′′1 .
2. Case (〈p, w〉, θ) ⇒ (〈p′′, u〉, θ′′) is obtained by a rule of the form p (σ,σ
′)
↪−−−−→
p′′ ∈ ∆c i.e θ′′ 6= θ. In this case, u1 = γ. By the saturation rule β2, we obtain
that
(p, θ)
[γ,b0]−−−−→T (p0, θ0) where θ′′ = θ\{r1} ∪ {r2}, b0 = B(p) ∨ b′′0 . (4)
Putting (1) and (4) together, we have the following path
(p, θ)
[γ,b0]−−−−→T (p0, θ0) [w1,b
′′
1 ]−−−−−→T (p′, θ′) i.e. (p, θ) [w,b]−−−→T (p′, θ′) where b = b0∨b′′1
(5)
Furthermore, if (〈p, w〉, θ) ⇒r (〈p′, 〉, θ′), then (〈p, w〉, θ) ⇒r (〈p′′, u〉, θ′′) or
(〈p′′, u〉, θ′′)⇒r (〈p′, 〉, θ′).
For the first case, (〈p, w〉, θ) ⇒r (〈p′′, u〉, θ′′), then p ∈ G i.e. B(p) = 1. For
the second case, (〈p′′, u〉, θ′′) ⇒r (〈p′, 〉, θ′), we can get b′′ = 1 (from induction
hypothesis). Thus, b = b0 ∨ b′′1 = B(p) ∨ b′′0 ∨ b′′1 = B(p) ∨ b′′ = 1. Therefore, if
(〈p, w〉, θ)⇒r (〈p′, 〉, θ′), then we can obtain b = 1.
2
From these two lemmas, we get:
Theorem 3. Let [c, b] be a labelled configuration. Then [c, b] is in L(Apre∗
(
(〈p′, 〉, θ′))
iff c ∈ pre∗((〈p′, 〉, θ′)). Moreover, c⇒r (〈p′, 〉, θ′) iff b = 1.
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Proof: Let [(〈p, w〉, θ), b] be a configuration of pre∗((〈p′, 〉, θ′))). Then (〈p, w〉, θ)⇒∗
(〈p′, 〉, θ′). By Lemma 2, we can obtain that there exists a path (p, θ) [w,b]−−−→T
(p′, θ′) in Apre∗
(
(〈p′, 〉, θ′)). So [(〈p, w〉, θ), b] is in L(Apre∗((〈p′, 〉, θ′))). More-
over, if (〈p, w〉, θ)⇒r (〈p′, 〉, θ′), then b = 1.
Conversely, let [(〈p, w〉, θ), b] be a configuration accepted by Apre∗
(
(〈p′, 〉, θ′))
i.e. there exists a path (p, θ)
[w,b]−−−→T (p′, θ′) in Apre∗
(
(〈p′, 〉, θ′)). By Lemma
3, (〈p, w〉, θ) ⇒∗ (〈p′, 〉, θ′) i.e. (〈p, w〉, θ) ∈ pre∗(L(A)). Moreover, if b = 1,
(〈p, w〉, θ)⇒r (〈p′, 〉, θ′).
2
4.4 Computing the Head Reachability Graph G
Based on the definition of the Head Reachability Graph G, and on Theorem 3,
we can compute G as follows. Initially, G has no edges.
α′1: if rc : p
(σ,σ′)
↪−−−−→ p′ ∈ ∆c, then for every phase θ such that rc ∈ θ and every
γ ∈ Γ , we add the edge ((p, γ), θ) B(p)−−−→ ((p′, γ), θ0) to the graph G, where
θ0 = θ \ σ ∪ σ′.
α′2: if r : 〈p, γ〉 ↪→ 〈p0, γ0〉 ∈ ∆, then for every phase θ such that r ∈ θ, we add
the edge ((p, γ), θ)
B(p)−−−→ ((p0, γ0), θ) to the graph G.
α′3: if r : 〈p, γ〉 ↪→ 〈p0, γ0γ′〉 ∈ ∆, then for every phase θ such that r ∈ θ, we add
to the graph G the edge ((p, γ), θ) B(p)−−−→ ((p0, γ0), θ). Moreover, for every
control point p′ ∈ P and phase θ′ such that Apre∗
(
(〈p′, 〉, θ′)) contains a
transition of the form t = (p0, θ)
[γ0,b]−−−−→T (p′, θ′), we add to the graph G the
edge ((p, γ), θ)
b∨B(p)−−−−→ ((p′, γ′), θ′).
Items α′1 and α
′
2 are obvious. They respectively correspond to item 1 and
item 2 of Definition 4 (since B(p) = 1 iff p ∈ G). Item α′3 is based on
Lemma 1 and on item 3 of Definition 4. Indeed, it follows from Lemma 1 that
Apre∗
(
(〈p′, 〉, θ′)) contains a transition of the form (p0, θ) [γ0,b]−−−−→T (p′, θ′) implies
that (〈p0, γ0〉, θ) ⇒∗ (〈p′, 〉, θ′), and if b = 1, then (〈p0, γ0〉, θ) ⇒r (〈p′, 〉, θ′).
Thus, in this case, the edge ((p, γ), θ)
b∨B(p)−−−−→ ((p′, γ′), θ′) is added to G (item 3
of Definition 4) since 〈p, γ〉 ↪→ 〈p0, γ0γ′〉 ∈ ∆.
5 Experiments
5.1 Our approach vs. standard LTL for PDSs
We implemented our approach in a tool and we compared its performance against
the approaches that consist in translating the SM-PDS to an equivalent stan-
dard (or symbolic) PDS, and then applying the standard LTL model checking
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algorithms implemented in the PDS model-checker tool Moped [27]. All our ex-
periments were run on Ubuntu 16.04 with a 2.7 GHz CPU, 2GB of memory.
To perform the comparison, we randomly generate several SM-PDSs and LTL
formulas of different sizes. The results (CPU Execution time) are shown in Ta-
ble 1. Column Size is the size of SM-PDS (S1 for non-modifying transitions ∆
and S2 for modifying transitions ∆c). Column LTL gives the size of the tran-
sitions of the Bu¨chi automaton generated from the LTL formula (using the tool
LTL2BA[21]). Column SM-PDS gives the cost of our direct algorithm presented
in this paper. Column PDS shows the cost it takes to get the equivalent PDS
from the SM-PDS. Column Result reports the cost it takes to run the LTL PDS
model-checker Moped [27] for the PDS we got. Column Total is the total cost
it takes to translate the SM-PDS into a PDS and then apply the standard LTL
model checking algorithm of Moped (Total=PDS+Result). Column Symbolic
PDS reports the cost it takes to get the equivalent Symbolic PDS from the SM-
PDS. Column Result1 is the cost to run the Symbolic PDS LTL model-checker
Moped. Column Total1 is the total cost it takes to translate the SM-PDS into
a symbolic PDS and then apply the standard LTL model checking algorithm
of Moped. You can see that our direct algorithm (Column SM-PDS ) is much
more efficient than translating the SM-PDS to an equivalent (symbolic) PDS,
and then run the standard LTL model-checker Moped. Translating the SM-
PDS to a standard PDS may take more than 20 days, whereas our
direct algorithm takes only a few seconds. Moreover, since the obtained
standard (symbolic) PDS is huge, Moped failed to handle several cases (the time
limit that we set for Moped is 20 minutes), whereas our tool was able to deal
with all the cases in only a few seconds.
5.2 Malicious Behavior Detection on Self-Modifying Code
Specifying Malicious Behaviors using LTL. As described in [4], several
malicious behaviors can be described by LTL formulas. We give in what follows
three examples of such malicious behaviors and show how they can be described
by LTL formulas:
Registry Key Injecting: In order to get started at boot time, many malwares
add themselves into the registry key listing. This behavior is typically imple-
mented by first calling the API function GetModuleFileNameA to retrieve the
path of the malware’s executable file. Then, the API function RegSetValueExA
is called to add the file path into the registry key listing. This malicious behavior
can be described in LTL as follows:
φrk = F
(
call GetModuleF ileNameA ∧ F( call RegSetV alueExA))
This formula expresses that if a call to the API function GetModuleFile-
NameA is followed by a call to the API function RegSetValueExA, then probably
a malware is trying to add itself into the registry key listing.
Data-Stealing: Stealing data from the host is a popular malicious behavior that
intend to steal any valuable information including passwords, software codes,
bank information, etc. To do this, the malware needs to scan the disk to find the
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Size LTL SM-PDS PDS Result Total Symbolic PDSResult1 Total1
S1 : 5, S2 : 2 |δ|:15 0.07s 0.09s 0.01s 0 .10s 0.08s 0.00s 0.08s
S1 : 5, S2 : 3 |δ|:8 0.06s 0.08s 0.01s 0.09s 0.09s 0.00s 0.09s
S1 : 11, S2 : 4 |δ|:8 0.16s 0.13s 0.05s 0.18s 0.10s 0.00s 0.10s
S1 : 5, S2 : 3 |δ|:10 0.06s 0.15s 0.01s 0.16s 0.09s 0.00s 0.09s
S1 : 110, S2 : 4 |δ|:8 0.34s 186.10s 0.79s 186.99s 0.35s 0.00s 0.35s
S1 : 255, S2 : 8 |δ|:8 0.39s 281.02s 0.94s 281.96s 4.82s 0.05s 4.87s
S1 : 255, S2 : 8 |δ|:10 0.42s 281.02s 0.97s 281.99s 4.82s 0.06s 4.88s
S1 : 110, S2 : 4 |δ|:15 0.28s 186.10s 1.05s 187.15s 0.35s 0.06s 0.41s
S1 : 255, S2 : 8 |δ|:15 0.46s 281.02s 1.92s 282.94s 4.82s 0.08s 4.90s
S1 : 110, S2 : 4 |δ|:20 0.37s 186.10s 1.05s 187.15s 0.35s 0.06s 0.41s
S1 : 255, S2 : 8 |δ|:20 0.55s 281.02s 1.97s 282.99s 4.82s 0.17s 4.99s
S1 : 255, S2 : 8 |δ|:25 0.59s 281.02s 1.23s 282.99s 4.82s 0.24s 5.36s
S1 : 2059, S2 : 7 |δ|:8 0.86s 19525.01s 20.71s 19545.72s 20.70s error -
S1 : 2059, S2 : 9 |δ|:8 1.49s 19784.7s 79.12s 19863.32 128.12s error -
S1 : 2059, S2 : 11 |δ|:8 3.73s 30011.67s 168.15s 30179.82s 261.07s error -
S1 : 2059, S2 : 11 |δ|:28 6.88s 30011.67s 169.55s 30180.22s 261.07s error -
S1 : 3050, S2 : 10 |δ|:8 5.21s 39101.57s killed - 438.27s error -
S1 : 3090, S2 : 10 |δ|:8 5.86s 40083.07s killed - 438.69s error -
S1 : 3050, S2 : 10 |δ|:20 7.24s 39101.57s killed - 438.27s error -
S1 : 3090, S2 : 10 |δ|:30 8.38s 40083.07s killed - 438.69s error -
S1 : 3090, S2 : 10 |δ|:25 8.89s 40083.07s killed - 438.69s error -
S1 : 4050, S2 : 10 |δ|:8 9.21s 81408.91s killed - 699.19s error -
S1 : 4050, S2 : 10 |δ|:28 11.64s 81408.91s killed - 699.19s error -
S1 : 4058, S2 : 11 |δ|:8 9.83s 93843.37s killed - 802.07s error -
S1 : 4058, S2 : 11 |δ|:25 13.59s 93843.37s killed - 802.07s error -
S1 : 5050, S2 : 11 |δ|:8 10.34s 173943.37s killed - 921.16s error -
S1 : 5090, S2 : 11 |δ|:8 10.52s 179993.54s killed - 929.32s error -
S1 : 5090, S2 : 11 |δ|:10 12.89s 179993.54s killed - 929.32s error -
S1 : 6090, S2 : 11 |δ|:8 13.49s 190293.64s killed - 1002.73s error -
S1 : 6090, S2 : 11 |δ|:10 15.81s 190293.64s killed - 1002.73s error -
S1 : 6090, S2 : 11 |δ|:40 32.39s 190293.64s killed - 1002.73s error -
S1 : 7090, S2 : 11 |δ|:25 39.86s 198932.32s killed - 1092.28s error -
S1 : 7090, S2 : 11 |δ|:30 43.24s 198932.32s killed - 1092.28s error -
S1 : 9090, S2 : 11 |δ|:8 29.98s 199987.98s killed - 1128.19s error -
S1 : 9090, S2 : 11 |δ|:20 45.29s 199987.98s killed - 1128.19s error -
S1 : 10050, S2 : 12 |δ|:8 48.53s 2134587.14s killed - 1469.28s error -
S1 : 10050, S2 : 12 |δ|:25 59.69s 2134587.14s killed - 1469.28s error -
S1 : 10050, S2 : 12 |δ|:30 61.42s 2134587.14s kille d - 1469.28s error -
S1 : 10150, S2 : 12 |δ|:35 64.17s 2134633.28s killed - 1469.28s error -
S1 : 10150, S2 : 14 |δ|:8 58.34s 2181975.64s killed - 2849.96s error -
S1 : 10150, S2 : 14 |δ|:40 82.72s 2181975.64s killed - 2849.96s error -
S1 : 10150, S2 : 12 |δ|:40 76.61s 2134633.28s killed - 1469.28s error -
S1 : 10150, S2 : 16 |δ|:45 89.83s 2211008.82s killed - 3665.59s error -
S1 : 10150, S2 : 12 |δ|:60 97.56s 2134633.28s killed - 1469.28s error -
S1 : 10150, S2 : 12 |δ|:65 105.89s 2134633.28s killed - 1469.28s error -
S1 : 10150, S2 : 16 |δ|:65 134.45s 2211008.82s killed - 3665.59s error -
S1 : 10180, S2 : 16 |δ|:65 175.29s 2134643.52s killed - 3689.83s error -
S1 : 10180, S2 : 16 |δ|:78 214.36s 2134643.52s killed - 3689.83s error -
Table 1: Our approach vs. standard LTL for PDSs
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interesting file that he wants to steal. After finding the file, the malware needs to
locate it. To this aim, the malware first calls the API function GetModuleHan-
dleA to get a base address to search for a location of the file. Then the malware
starts looking for the interesting file by calling the API function FindFirstFileA.
Then the API functions CreateFileMappingA and MapViewOfFile are called to
access the file. Finally, the specific file can be copied by calling the API function
CopyFileA. Thus, this data-stealing malicious behavior can be described by the
following LTL formula as follows:
φds = F(call GetModuleHandleA ∧F(call F indF irstF ileA∧F (call CreateF ileMappingA
∧ F (call MapV iewofF ile ∧ F call CopyF ileA))))
Spy-Worm: A spy worm is a malware that can record data and send it using the
Socket API functions. For example, Keylogger is a spy worm that can record the
keyboard states by calling the API functions GetAsyKeyState and GetKeyState
and send that to the specific server by calling the socket function sendto. Another
spy worm can also spy on the I/O device rather than the keyboard. For this, it
can use the API function GetRawInputData to obtain input from the specified
device, and then send this input by calling the socket functions send or sendto.
Thus, this malicious behavior can be described by the following LTL formula:
φsw = F
(
(call GetAsyncKeyState ∨ call GetRawInputData) ∧ F(call sendto ∨
call send)
)
Appending virus: An appending virus is a virus that inserts a copy of its code
at the end of the target file. To achieve this, since the real OFFSET of the virus’
variables depends on the size of the infected file, the virus has to first compute
its real absolute address in the memory. To perform this, the virus has to call
the sequence of instructions: l1: call f ; l2: ....; f : pop eax;. The instruction call
f will push the return address l2 onto the stack. Then, the pop instruction in f
will put the value of this address into the register eax. Thus, the virus can get
its real absolute address from the register eax. This malicious behavior can be
described by the following LTL formula:
φav =
∨
F
(
call ∧X(top-of-stack = a) ∧G¬(ret ∧ (top-of-stack = a)))
where the
∨
is taken over all possible return addresses a, and top-of-stack=a
is a predicate that indicates that the top of the stack is a. The subformula
call ∧X(top-of-stack = a) means that there exists a procedure call having a as
return address. Indeed, when a procedure call is made, the program pushes its
corresponding return address a to the stack. Thus, at the next step, a will be on
the top of the stack. Therefore, the formula above expresses that there exists a
procedure call having a as return address, such that there is no ret instruction
which will return to a.
Note that this formula uses predicates that indicate that the top of the stack
is a. Our techniques work for this case as well: it suffices to encode the top of
the stack in the control points of the SM-PDS. Our implementation works for
this case as well and can handle appending viruses.
Applying our tool for malware detection. We applied our tool to detect
several malwares. We use the unpack tool unpacker [28] to handle packers like
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UPX, and we use Jakstab [12] as disassembler. We consider 160 malwares from
the malware library VirusShare [32], 184 malwares from the malware library
MalShare [25], 288 email-worms from VX heaven [31] and 260 new malwares
generated by NGVCK, one of the best malware generators. We also choose 19
benign samples from Windows XP system. We consider self-modifying versions
of these programs. In these versions, the malicious behaviors are unreachable if
the semantics of the self-modifying instructions are not taken into account, i.e.,
if the self-modifying instructions are considered as “standard” instructions that
do not modify the code, then the malicious behaviors cannot be reached. To
check this, we model such programs in two ways:
1. First, we take into account the self-modifying instructions and model these
programs using SM-PDSs as described in Section 2.3. Then, we check whether
these SM-PDSs satisfy at least one of the malicious LTL formulas presented
above. If yes, the program is declared as malicious, if not, it is declared as
benign. Our tool was able to detect all the 892 self-modifying malwares as
malicious, and to determine that benign programs are benign. We report
in Table 3 the results we obtained. Column Size is the number of control
locations, Column Result gives the result of our algorithm: Yes means ma-
licious and No means benign; and Column cost gives the cost to apply our
LTL model-checker to check one of the LTL properties described above.
2. Second, we abstract away the self-modifying instructions and proceed as
if these instructions were not self-modifying. In this case, we translate the
binary codes to standard pushdown systems as described in [3]. By using
PDSs as models, none of the malwares that we consider was detected as
malicious, whereas, as reported in Table 3, using self-modifying PDSs as
models, and applying our LTL model-checking algorithm allowed to detect
all the 892 malwares that we considered.
Note that checking the formulas φrk, φds, and φsw could be done using mul-
tiple pre∗ queries on SM-PDSs using the pre∗ algorithm of [29]. However, this
would be less efficient than performing our direct LTL model-checking algorithm,
as shown in Table 2, where Column Size gives the number of control locations,
Column LTL gives the time of applying our LTL model-checking algorithm; and
Column Multiple pre∗ gives the cost of applying multiple pre∗ on SM-PDSs to
check the properties φrk, φds, and φsw. It can be seen that applying our direct
LTL model checking algortihm is more efficient. Furthermore, the appending
virus formula φav cannot be solved using multiple pre
∗ queries. Our direct LTL
model-checking algorithm is needed in this case. Note that some of the malwares
we considered in our experiments are appending viruses. Thus, our algorithm and
our implementation are crucial to be able to detect these malwares.
our tool McAfee Norman BitDefender Kinsoft Avira eScan Kaspersky Qihoo360 Baidu Avast Symantec
100% 24.8% 19.5% 31.2% 9.7% 34.1% 21.9% 53.1% 51.7% 1.4% 68.3% 82.4%
Table 4: Detection rate: Our tool vs. well known antiviruses
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Comparison with well-known antiviruses. We compare our tool against
well-known and widely used antiviruses. Since known antiviruses update their
signature database as soon as a new malware is known, in order to have a fair
comparision with these antiviruses, we need to consider new malwares. We use
the sophisticated malware generator NGVCK available at VX Heavens [31] to
generate 205 malwares. We obfuscate these malwares with self-modifying code,
and we fed them to our tool and to well known antiviruses such as BitDefender,
Kinsoft, Avira, eScan, Kaspersky, Qihoo-360, Baidu, Avast, and Symantec. Our
tool was able to detect all these programs as malicious, whereas none of the
well-known antiviruses was able to detect all these malwares. Table 4 reports
the detection rates of our tool and the well-known anti-viruses.
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